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RENDERING UNTO CAESAR OR
ELECTIONEERING FOR CAESAR? LOSS OF
CHURCH TAX EXEMPTION FOR
PARTICIPATION IN ELECTORAL POLITICS
ALAN L. FELD*

Abstract. The restriction on church participation in political canipaigns
contained in the Internal Revenue Code operates uneasily. It appears to
serve the useful purpose of separating the spheres of religion and
electoral politics. But the separation often is only apparent, as churches
in practice signal support for a particular candidate in a variety of rays
that historically have not cost them their exemptions. Although the
limited enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service has reflected the
sensitive nature of the First Amendment values present, the federal
government should provide more formal elaboration by statute or
regulation. Focus on the use of funds seems AMranted, to prevent the
diversion of government subsidy from exempt purposes to political
activity. Beyond that comparatively clear line, the practical difficulties of
enforcement loom large.
INTRODUCTION

The federal income tax casts a broad net. It subjects individuals,
corporations, trusts, and other entities to reporting, payment, and
vithholding requirements. It also provides exemption fiom one or
more of these duties for a select list of organizations. Section
501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code generally exempts from income tax entities organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes, including religious purposes, provided they meet three conditions.' No part of the net earnings may inure to ie benefit of any
private shareholder or individual. No substantial part of its activities
may consist of carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to
influence legislation. Finally, the entity may not participate in or intervene in a political campaign for public office. The first condition

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.

I.RC. § 501(c) (3) (1986).
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maintains the not-for-profit character of the entity.2 The latter two requirements condition tax exemption on the entity's limited participation in the nation's political life. They differ in one important respect.
The Internal Revenue Code restricts lobbying only when it constitutes
a "substantial" part of the organization's activities, while it treats elec3
toral politics as absolutely inconsistent with exemption.
Constraints on political participation raise a variety of issues that
engage First Amendment values, including abridgement of freedom
of speech and of the right to petition government for redress of grievances. The Supreme Court considered and rejected a challenge on
these grounds to the anti-lobbying condition of section 501(c) (3).4
The Court held that the Code did not deny the organization in that
case the right to receive deductible contributions fbr its non-lobbying
activity. The Code simply declined to support the lobbying activity
5
with public funds.
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider a similar
challenge to the political constraints under the clause of the First
Amendment that deals with the free exercise of religion. Other courts
have. In a prominent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit rejected the claim by Christian Echoes National Ministry that the Constitution allowed it to lobby beyond section
501 (c) (3) 's permitted limits without losing its exemption. 6
Turning to the third condition for tax exemption, nonintervention in political campaigns, a recent case has affirmed, apparently for
the first time, the revocation of a church's tax exemption for active

2 See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of NonprofitEntelprise,89 YALX LJ. 835, 835
(1980).

3The Internal Revenue Code separately imposes excise taxes on amounts paid by private foundations to influence legislation or to influence any election. The definition of
private foundations excludes churches. SeeI.R.C. § 4945 (1986).
- Regan v.Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983); see also Ganimarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
5 Taxation with Representation,461 U.S. at 545-46.
6Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 E2d 849, 854-55 (10th Cih:
1972). Congress later allowed certain exempt organizations to elect to engage in lobbying
activities deemed insubstantial, as measured by the organization's expenditures for that

function. See I.R.C. § 501 (h) (1986). The legislation excluded churches and related organizations from the election, on the ground that church groups had raised objections
based on First Amendment rights. The legislative history specifically said that Congress
had neither approved nor disapproved the statements or holding; of the ChristianEchoes
case. STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TIlE

TAX REFORMi AcT OF 1976 at 415-16, reprintedin 1976-3 C.B. 1,427-28 (vol. 2).
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participation in an election. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia concluded that the IRS properly had revoked
the tax exemption. The case illustrates the competing claims of tax
burdens and benefits and the organization's impetus to address the
public from a religious standpoint.
I. THE CHURCH AT PIERCE CREEK

Branch Ministries, also known as the Church at Pierce Creek, and
its pastor, Dan Little, placed full-page ads in two newspapers, the
Washington Times and USA Today, four days before the 1992 presidential election. The ads, headed in bold type "Christian Beware," opposed the election as President of Governor Bill Clinton. It bulleted
three positions Clinton assertedly supported or promoted-abortion
on demand, the homosexual lifestyle, and giving condoms to teenagers in public schools. It said the Bible warns us not to follow another
in his sin. It concluded, "How then can we vote for Bill Clinton?" In
smaller print at the bottom of the page appeared the following notice:
"This advertisement was co-sponsored by The Church at Pierce Creek,
Daniel J. Little, Senior Pastor, and by churches and concerned Christians nationwide. Tax-deductible donations for this advertisement
gladly accepted. Make donations to: The Church at Pierce Creek." s
After a lengthy review, in part mandated by Code provisions
granting churches special procedural protections,9 the Internal Revenue Service revoked Branch Ministries' tax exemption. The district
court agreed with the IRS and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.10 The appellate court held that revocation of the exemption did not place a substantial burden on Branch Ministries' exercise of religion." It said
that the church did not claim that withdrawal from electoral politics
would violate its beliefs. Loss of tax exemption, the court sald, might
decrease the funds otherwise available for religious practices, but that
does not constitute a constitutionally significant burden. 12 Indeed, if
the church did not intervene in future political camnpaigns, it could
7

Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000), affg40 F. Supp. 2d
15 (D.D.C.
1999).
8
d at 140.
9 See I.R.C. § 7611 (1986).
10 Branch Ministries -, Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000), affg40 F. Supp. 2d
15 (D.D.C. 1999).
1 See id. at 142-44.
1
2 The court cited Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378. 391
(1990) and Hernandez A,Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989) for this proposition.
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hold itself out as tax-exempt.13 The court also rejected a claim by the
church of selective prosecution.' 4 The church noted instances of candidate appearances or endorsements under the auspices of other
churches.' 5 The court responded that Branch Ministries had cited to
no other instance of advertising by a church for or against a political
candidate in a national newspaper and solicitation of tax-deductible
funds.' 6 In other words, the IRS did not abuse its discretion by prosecuting the most egregious case.
Although Branch Ministries addressed the exemption from tax
under section 501 (c) (3), the holding also implicates the treatment of
donors to the church. Section 170(c) (2), which defines the major
category of recipients of tax-deductible gifts, contains parallel conditions for qualification. When Branch Ministries lost its tax exemption
its donors no longer could deduct their gifts to the church as charitable contributions.
II. ANALYSIS
The court reached the correct conclusion under current law. The
Code's limitation on church participation in electoral politics, however, raises a difficult question of administration and enforcement.
The IRS has exercised great restraint in its enforcement of the prohibition and perhaps the statute or the regulations should reflect these
limits more formally.
The court and both sides in the case agreed that the constitutional result turned on a comparison of the burden imposed on
Branch Ministries by revocation of the tax exemption and the interests forwarded by conditioning exemption on avoidance of electoral
politics. 17 Turning first to the burden, at least four considerations argue that the burden did not constitute a serious interference with the
free exercise of religion.
A. The LimitationDoes Not Apply to Individuals
The statute addresses the political activity only of exempt entities.
Each individual member of a church may participate in full in electoral politics. When a prominent church leader acts or speaks, agency
13 See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142.

14Id. at 144-45.
15 Id. at 144.
16 Id. at 144-45.
17 See id. at 142-44.
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principles must determine whether to impute the action to the
church. For most religious traditions, the religious leader acts as
teacher. In many, an utterance from the religious leader as an individual constitutes the necessary and sufficient guidance for political
attitudes and actions of the faithful. No action by the exempt entity as
an entity need occur. The statutory conditions that rule out political
activity under sections 170(c) (2) and 501 (c) (3) constran only the
formal actions of the exempt entity or the use of its property, through
expenditure of its funds or use of its physical facilities, in order to
forward a candidacy. Thus, a minister or a lay church official, in an
individual capacity, may walk through town wearing a campaign button. Religiously motivated individuals can speak truth to power without penalty. They simply cannot use the corporate form or the church
coffers to do it.
B. ParallelOganizations
Participants in charitable endeavors have long found ways to forward activities not suitable for the exempt entity. The simplest consists
of the formation of a parallel organization, not intended to qualify
under section 501 (c) (3). The charity carries out its exempt function
exclusively. The parallel organization engages in the other activities,
including those that might fall within the regulation's definition of an
"action organization." 18 The parallel organization may seek tax exemption under Code section 501(c) (4), as a social welfare organization. The fundamental tax difference between the charity and the
parallel organization concerns donations. Donors to the parallel organization ordinarily would not deduct their gifts.19 The existence of
two organizations thus segregates the tax-favored contributions of the
charity from the nonexempt charitable activities. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in Regan v. Taxation with Repiwentation, thought this opportunity to create a parallel organization critical to holding the restric20
tion on lobbying in 501 (c) (3) constitutional.
For participation in electoral canpaigns, however, the parallelism
becomes more complex. An organization exempt under section
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (c) (3) (1990) defines the term "action organization" to
include entities a substantial part of the actiities of which includc lobbying or which par-

ticipate in election campaigns.

19Deductibility, although not as charitable gifts, sometimes may be a-ailable for donations to certain exempt organizations, such as chambers of comnmerce. Treas. Reg. § 1.16228 (1995) requires allocation of expenses to nondeductible lobbying actihities.
- Se461 U.S. 540, 552-54 (1983) (Blackmun,J., concurring).
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501 (c) (4) may not participate in political campaigns. 21 The parallel
organization would either forego tax exemption or, as the court of
appeals suggested, could form yet a third entity, a political organization under Code section 527. The members of the church thus can
send their political message, but not with the use of deductible dollars
and at the cost of maintaining several corporate entities.

C. Effects ofLoss of Tax Exemption
Charitable institutions pursue tax exemption for reasons already
suggested: to prevent income taxation on the entity's income and to
become eligible to receive tax-deductible donations. In addition, state
law may exempt federally exempt entities from sales tax. Other
benefits to section 501 (c) (3) status exist. 22 But the practical
significance of exemption will vary greatly with the entity. Suppose the
federal tax law treated a church as a taxable entity engaged in the
business of providing religious services. Most churches nevertheless
would incur little or no tax liability because they do not earn taxable
income. A religious organization typically receives much of its revenue
in the form of donations. As the IRS conceded in Branch Ministries v.
Rossotti, gifts do not constitute income. Absent an argument that the
church received payment for services rather than gifts,2 3 the receipts
actually subject to tax would include investment income and little
else. Deductions would include salaries and similar expenses of providing the services. The church likely would have little or no tax liability. Again, the burden lies not in the taxation of the entity but in the
loss of donor deductions for gifts to the church.

D. Go and Sin No More
The Code does not explicitly bar a church that lost its exemption
by reason of political activity from reapplying for exemption. 24 The
court of appeals in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti said the IRS had
confirmed that if the church does not intervene in future political
21Treas.

Reg. § 1.501 (c) (4)-l (a) (2) (ii) (1990).

2 For example, special postal rates.
2 See Hernandez v. Comin'r, 490 U.S.

680, 689-92 (1989).

Section 504 bars an organization formerly treated as exempt tinder section
501 (c) (3), but which lost its exemption by reason of political activity, from qualifying for
exemption under section 501(c)(4). Section 504(c) contains a special exception for
churches. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (h)-3(d) (1990) allows an organization that lost its section
501 (c) (3) exemption because lobbying was a substantial activity to reapply for exemption
in any taxable year after the first year in which exemption was denied.
24
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campaigns it may hold itself out as exempt under section 501 (c) (3).2
Unlike virtually all other kinds of exempt organizations, churches enjoy exemption without having first to obtain an IRS ruling as to tax
status.2 6 Absence of a prior ruling would put potential donors at risk
of establishing the exempt character of the church in order to obtain
a deduction under sections 170 (income tax), 2055 (estate tax), or
2522 (gift tax). The court did not say so, but the church presumably
could reapply for exemption if it renounced political activity
Turning to the interests potentially forwarded by the antipolitical activity requirement, at least some of the argument turns on
the treatment of charities' tax-favored position as a subsidy. The entities described in sections 501 (c) (3) and 170(c) (2) receive tax benefits
analogous to subsidies. Remission of tax liability produces the same
net economic effect as a direct payment fiom the government. The
government properly can limit the use of its subsidy to the exempt
purposes for which the entity was organized. More affirmatively, it
properly can conclude that government dollars should flow into political campaigns only in specifically defined ways. The Supreme Court
in Taxation with Representation and the court of appeals in Branch Minlistriesaccepted this characterization of the tax exemption for charities
and the tax deduction for charitable gifts.
Not everyone has viewed these provisions as conferring subsidy.
Some scholars have justified tax exemption for charities on other
grounds.2 7 Thus, any tax requires initial definition of its base. An income tax plausibly could apply only to entities engaged in profitseeking activities. Excepting charities fiom such a tax arguably consists of definition of the tax base, not tax subsidy. And although the
dominant view treats the deduction for charitable contributions as a
28
subsidy, dissenting voices exist
More affirmatively, the restriction on electoral activities may serve
the salutary function of limiting the extent to which political caipaigns might deflect charities from focus on their exempt functions.
As applied to churches, if the heat of the political moment converted
25 211 E3d at 142.

- I.R.G. § 508(c) (1) (A) (1986).
27 Boris I. Bittker & George K Raldert, The Eemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom
FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE LJ. 299, 299 (1976); Evelyn Brody, Of Soxvrignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizingthe Charity Tax Exenption, 23 IowAJ. CoRe. L. 585,585 (1998).
2 See William D. Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HAtv. L RPm.
309, 344-75 (1972). See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "'enefits"forReligious Institutions ConstitutionallyDependent on Ben efitsfor SeetlarEntities, 42 B.C. L REv. 805 (2001).
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electoral competition into religious strife, the result could damage
society and community.
III. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF CURRENT LAW

The restriction on church participation in elections can serve
useful functions. But it operates unsatisfactorily in practice, in at least
two related ways.
First, churches routinely engage in activities that endorse or
promote a particular candidate. In communities where churches play
an important role, the church becomes a natural place to embrace a
candidate thought to have befriended that community. If the minister
introduces a candidate from the pulpit at the Sunday service before
election day, the church gives its approval to that candidate and has
participated to that extent in the political campaign. These activities
literally contravene the statutory condition, yet the IRS generally ignores them.29 However, if the church spends no funds to promote the
candidate and the use of its property incurs only nominal expense,
the activity arguably does not entail the expenditure of tax-subsidized
dollars in the political campaign. If we articulate the purpose of the
restriction as assuring that tax-subsidized dollars go exclusively for exempt purposes, endorsement activities of this kind do not violate the
purpose of the statute.
Second, auditing the activities of churches for forbidden political
activity presents significant problems. How is the IRS to obtain information as to whether the church expended funds for inappropriate
electoral purposes? May it review the church's accounts and its charitable and sacral works to determine whether the entity stepped over
the bounds set out in the statute? If the minister wears a campaign
button, is he doing so in his individual capacity (permissible) or as an
agent of the church (perhaps impermissible). Branch Ministries v. Rossotti presents the easiest case for enforcement because the facts are
not disputable and significant expenditures of funds occurred.30 Few
cases announce their violation of both the statute and one of its underlying purposes with such clarity.
In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of property tax exemption for religious institutions as an
29For a description of recent electoral practices, see generally Randy Lee, When a King
Speaks of God, Wen a God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics and the Constitution in the Clinton
Administration, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391 (2000).
o 211 E3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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appropriate way to avoid undue entanglements between those institutions and government 3L1 Enforcement of the election camnpaign restriction in a literal way would create just such entanglements.
CONCLUSION

The restriction on church participation in political cunpaigns
contained in the Code operates uneasily. It appears to serve the useful
purpose of separating the spheres of religion and electoral politics.
But the separation often is only apparent, as churches in practice signal support for a particular candidate in a variety of wk-ays that historically have not cost them their exemptions. Literal enforcement of the
provision seems unpalatable, as it would create unfortunate entanglements between churches and government. Apparently widespread
violation of the terms of the statute loses respect for the law.
At a minimum, further clarification and restriction of the scope
of the restriction seems appropriate. Although enforcement by the
IRS has reflected the sensitive nature of the First Amendment values
present here, the government should provide more formal elabonation by statute or regulation. Focus on the use of funds seems warranted, to prevent the diversion of government subsidy from exempt
purposes to political activity. Beyond that compatively clear line, the
practical difficulties of enforcement loom large.

3' 397 U.S. 664, 673-77 (1970).

